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Déjà vu Showgirls v. Nev. Dept. of Taxation, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 73 (Sept. 18, 2014)1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LIVE ENTERTAINMENT TAX
Summary
Exotic dancing establishments sought a declaration that Nevada’s Live Entertainment
Tax (NLET) violates the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because it singles out small
groups based on the content of their speech and taxes them in an effort to suppress their ideas.
The Supreme Court of Nevada found that NLET does not discriminate on the basis of speech,
target a small group of speakers, or threaten to suppress viewpoints or ideas in violation of the
First Amendment because appellants failed to show that NLET is not rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose.
Background
In 2003, the State Legislature enacted NLET, imposing up to a ten-percent excise tax on
admission fees, refreshments, and merchandise provided at certain live-entertainment facilities.2
In its original form, NLET contained ten exemptions based on a number of factors, including
location and size of a facility, entity status of a provider, and the type of entertainment provided,
among other things. Since enacting NLET, the Legislature has amended the tax on multiple
occasions, allowing for various exemptions and exceptions of certain types of liveentertainment.3
Beginning in 2006, appellants challenged NLET as being facially and as-applied
unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment. Appellants also sought an injunction
against its enforcement, and a refund of all taxes paid under the statute. In 2008, the Eighth
Judicial District Court consolidated the appellants’ claims and dismissed the as-applied challenge
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Discussion
I.
In Nevada, a taxpayer generally must exhaust all administrative remedies before a district
court may properly have subject matter jurisdiction over a state tax claim.4 The Court recognizes
three possible exceptions to this rule when: administrative proceedings would be futile, statutory
interpretation is contested, or the facial constitutionality of a claim is at issue.5 Although
appellants agreed that they did not exhaust their administrative remedies, they claimed that their
as-applied challenge was improperly dismissed by the district court because their challenge
involved a constitutional issue. The Court noted the appellants failed to distinguish between
1
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More specifically, NLET imposes a 10% tax rate for facilities having a maximum occupancy of less than 7,500
persons and a 5% tax rate for facilities having a maximum occupancy of 7,500 persons or more. NEV. REV. STAT. §
368A.200(1)(a–b) (2013).
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See generally NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 368A.090, 368A.200 (2013).
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facial constitutional challenges, which may bypass the administrative exhaustion requirement,
and as-applied constitutional challenges, which necessarily hinge on factual determinations
properly found by the administrative agency.6 Here, because appellants’ as-applied constitutional
challenge hinges on factual determinations not yet made, the Court found that appellants were
required to pursue administrative remedies, and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the asapplied challenge.
II.
The Court then considered whether NLET is facially unconstitutional for violating free
speech rights.
A.
Appellant’s argued that, under Murdock7, NLET violates the First Amendment because it
directly taxes live entertainment, which they asserted is categorically protected under the First
Amendment. The court rejects this argument for two reasons. First, the tax at issue in Murdock
was a flat license tax whereas NLET is an excise tax and Murdock was later held to apply only
“where a flat license tax operates as a prior restraint on the free exercise of religious beliefs.”8
Second, NLET is not a tax on live entertainment. It imposes an excise tax on business
transactions which neither inhibits nor burdens the expressive conduct occurring at liveentertainment facilities. Thus, NLET does not operate as a prior restraint on constitutionally
protected activities.
B.
A taxation statute that [1] discriminates based on the content of speech, or [2] that targets
small groups based on speech, or [3] that threatens to suppress speech, will trigger a test of strict
scrutiny.
First, the appellants argued that NLET discriminates against certain taxpayers by taxing
adult-oriented entertainment, while exempting family-oriented entertainment. The Court began
its discussion by emphasizing that “a tax scheme that discriminates among speakers does not
implicate the First Amendment unless it discriminates on the basis of ideas.”9 The test for
discrimination is two-fold: primarily, the court looks to the statute’s language, and second, it will
consider the differences in the speech of those who are and are not being taxed. Here, the Court
found no language in the statute referring to the taxpayer’s message. In addition, the Court found
that while NLET does have exemptions for certain live-entertainment facilities, both exempt and
non-exempt facilities bring diverse messages which span the adult- and family-oriented
spectrum. Based on the statutory language and the messages of those who are and are not taxed,
the Court found that NLET does not discriminate against taxpayers based on the content of their
speech.
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Second, the appellants argued that NLET targets a small group of speakers by forcing
them to bear the full burden of the tax through its exemptions of certain other taxpayers, thereby
encouraging censorship. The Court disagreed, finding that in 2004, over ninety liveentertainment facilities including raceways, nightclubs, performing arts centers, gentlemen’s
clubs, sporting facilities, and one-time event facilities were subject to NLET. Given the broad
base of taxpayers subject to NLET, the Court found that the tax does not impermissibly target a
small group of speakers, and therefore does not pose a danger of censorship.
Finally, the appellants claimed that because the Legislature created certain exemptions
and exceptions to the NLET, the specific purpose behind the tax is to suppress speech. The Court
found that this claim ignored the idea that “[i]nherent in the power to tax is the power to
discriminate in taxation,” and that unless “a classification is a hostile and oppressive
discrimination against particular persons and classes,” it will not require heightened scrutiny.10
Here, the Nevada Legislature’s decision to exempt and exclude certain facilities from an
otherwise broadly applicable tax does not indicate an intention or danger of suppressing
particular ideas.11
Conclusion
The Court found that strict scrutiny does not apply because NLET does not discriminate
based on the content of speech, target a small group of speakers, or threaten to suppress ideas.
Instead, the Court applied rational basis review and found that the tax is constitutional because
appellants failed to demonstrate that NLET is not rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose.
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Id. at 451–52 (internal quotations omitted).
See generally NRS Chapter 368A.

